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The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atom Bomb, the American Military Mind and the End of the Second 
World War 
 
The Second World War witnessed the most famous and controversial ending of any conflict in 
human history. The decision by the United States government to drop uranium and plutonium, fission-
based weapons (better known as atomic bombs) on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
makes its ending seminal. From the moment the bombs exploded there has been a debate, which 
shows no sign of abating, about the decision to cross the atomic threshold; whether the act was 
necessary, ethical, or even counter-productive. A multitude of books and articles have been written 
on the subject that go back and forth over the question of whether this was the best way to achieve 
victory.1 
This article will not rehash those arguments. What it aims to do, however, is examine one 
particular set of views, in many ways the most surprising—that of the top of the US strategic 
command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This group of two army generals and two navy admirals, all 
profoundly conventional, Caucasian, Christian, educated in military academies, born and raised in 
middle-class households—had a more complex set of ethical and strategic responses to the use of 
atomic weapons than one might assume. Looking at the range of their views on the issue of the atom 
bomb provides an important insight into how they viewed victory, the meaning of the Second World 
War and the state of the American military mind. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were the four most important military officers in the United States during the 
Second World War; Admiral William Leahy Chief of Staff to the President and Chairman of the joint 
chiefs, General George Marshall Chief of Staff of the Army, Admiral Ernest King Chief of Naval 
Operations, and General Henry (Hap) Arnold Chief of Staff of the Army Air Force.2 Collectively they 
were Franklin Roosevelt’s and Harry Truman’s highest ranking military advisers. Leahy was one of 
Roosevelt’s oldest friends in Washington, the two had become close in 1913 when they first met in 
the Navy Department. Marshall, King and Arnold had more professional relationships with the 
president and this made a material difference over the eventual decision to use the atomic bomb. 
While Roosevelt lived, Leahy had great influence over the president, particularly as time went on and 
Roosevelt weakened. After Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, however, things changed. Truman was an 
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army man by background and esteemed George Marshall in particular.. The shift would prove to be 
important as Leahy and Marshall’s views on the atom bomb diverged the most as time went by. 
The other two joint chiefs, King and Arnold, were less involved in the ultimate decision of 
whether and how to use the atom bomb. King was handicapped by the fact that the development of 
the atom bomb through the Manhattan Project, was an Army programme.3 As such Arnold, who as 
the head of the air force, though actually still under Marshall who was head of the army, could have 
tried to play an important role in determining atomic policy, was somewhat passive on the issue. His 
reluctance to get involved came at least partly from his poor health (Arnold had a number of major 
heart attacks during the war).  
The first thing that must be understood about the joint chiefs was that they were less 
important than the civilian leadership in making the final decision to drop the atom bomb. While 
Roosevelt had been alive, he kept such important decisions very close to his chest, often deciding 
things using only the joint chiefs with Harry Hopkins. Truman, on the other hand, feeling a little unsure 
and wanting very much to act in what he thought was Roosevelt’s spirit (but which decidedly was not) 
delegated a great deal of authority in the first few months of his Interim Committee to decide on the 
best way forward.4 Composed of government officials and scientists, the committee was chaired by 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson and, crucially, included James Byrnes as Truman’s personal 
representative. For Stimson this was represented a temporary increase in influence. While Roosevelt 
lived, the president had kept the elderly Republican away from many of the crucial meeting of the 
war. Stimson had, for instance, not been included in the grand-strategic conferences in Casablanca, 
Quebec (both first and second), Cairo, Tehran and Yalta—conferences which determined the strategy 
of the war and set many of conditions that were supposed to govern the peace afterwards. Truman, 
however, allowed the secretary of war to have some influence over important decisions such as the 
atom bomb.5 However even more than Stimson, the real beneficiary of the Interim Committee’s 
establishment was Byrnes. Roosevelt had been growingly increasingly irritated with Byrnes and just 
before FDR died, the South Carolinian was leaving his important position as head of the Office of 
Economic Stabilization. Truman, however, leaned heavily on Byrnes, whom he had originally thought 
Roosevelt would select to be the new vice president in 1944. Not only did he make Byrnes his personal 
representative on the Interim Committee, in late June 1945 he would soon make him the new 
secretary of state, when the incumbent, Edward Stettinius, resigned. 
The influence of Stimson and Byrnes mattered greatly as the former was mostly supportive of 
using the atomic bomb while the latter was enthusiastically supportive, and this made the formation 
of the interim committee vital. During the meeting of the committee on 31 May 1945, Stimson, who 
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was honestly torn about the meaning of the bomb endorsed the use of the atomic bomb against Japan 
without warning.6 However he made a contradictory claim that while the attack should not 
‘concentrate’ on a civilian area, an area of war industry closely surrounded by workers houses was the 
most ‘desirable target.’7 Byrnes had no such qualms. When the committee met again on 1 June, he 
dispensed with any of Stimson’s qualifications. According to the minutes: 
‘VI Use Of The Bomb: 
Mr. Byrnes recommended, and the committee agreed, that the Secretary of War should 
be advised that, while recognizing that the final selection of the target was essentially a military 
decision, the present view of the Committee was that the bomb should be used against Japan 
as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers’ homes; and that it 
be used without prior warning.’8 
One of the reasons Byrnes felt free to speak so forcefully on the issue is that he would have 
known that Truman, instinctively, was also supportive of using the bomb against Japan as soon as it 
was ready. Unlike Roosevelt, who seemed to become more and more enigmatic about the atomic 
bomb’s use the closer it came to being a reality,9 Truman was more openly supportive about dropping 
the bomb and even seemed slightly energized by the prospect of using the new weapon. He made no 
ethical comments about the weapon, except just before it was used when he wrote in a diary that it 
should not be used against women and children.10 However, he made no order to that effect, and 
when the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, he celebrated with gusto.11  
Thus, the civilian leadership was far more unified in favour of using the weapon and the civilian 
leadership, led by Truman, ultimately gave the go ahead for its use. This is particularly important 
because, had it been up to the US military led by the joint chiefs, the atom bomb might never have 
been used. The truth of the matter was that Leahy, Marshall, King and Arnold were all, to some degree, 
hesitant to use the atom bomb.12 The chiefs, and many other senior military personalities such as 
Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur and admirals Chester Nimitz and William Halsey 
all argued, mostly after the war it must be said, that dropping the atom bomb was either unnecessary 
or wrong.13 Within the chiefs there was a realization that the dropping of the bomb could shape the 
victory and the post-war world.  
 
King and Arnold: The Soft Middle 
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Though all the chiefs had some doubts, they approached the issue of the use of the atom 
bomb and the end of the war from quite different perspectives. The two most difficult to pin down, 
partly because their post-war stance conflicted with the contemporary record from May-August 1945, 
were King and Arnold. Both made negative comments about the atom bomb after the war, but there 
is little, if any, indication that they either held those views or tried to put them into action while the 
war was ongoing. 
Ernest King was the most enigmatic. There is no useful record of King saying anything about 
the atomic bomb before Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked, though he first was given information 
about the Manhattan Project in 1943.14 He never attended the Interim Committee and there seem to 
be no minutes kept of a JCS meeting during which the bomb was discussed.15 After the war, King was 
only slightly more forthcoming. He was quoted not long after the war saying that he did not like ‘any 
part of’ the atomic weapon.16 This has been used by a number of scholars to claim King was opposed 
to the attacks.17 However, this claim rests on very light evidence. It is probably best to say that King 
had doubts about the bomb, but was happy to stay out of the discussions and as such tacitly gave 
consent. In his private papers there are pages and pages of notes that he assembled to help write a 
memoir. They have stories ranging from the most mundane to the highest levels of grand strategy in 
the war.18 Yet in none of them does he address the question of the atom bomb in any detail. Only in 
the memoir itself, which he wrote (in the third person) with the assistance of a reserve naval officer, 
did King provide any meaningful glimpse into his thinking—and in an extremely short meditation. He 
was very negative about the use of the bomb, though more on the grounds of necessity than ethics. 
‘The President in giving his approval for these attacks appeared to believe that many of 
thousands of American troops would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was entirely 
correct; but King felt, as he had pointed out many times, that the dilemma was unnecessary 
one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, 
have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other 
essential materials. The Army, however, with its underestimation of sea power, had insisted 
upon a direct invasion and an occupational conquest of Japan proper. King still believes this was 
wrong.’19 
Of all the statements made by members of the joint chiefs about their general view of the 
atom bomb and the end of the war against Japan, this might be the most problematic. King is 
absolutely right in pinpointing that the discussion over the atom bomb cannot be seen in isolation, it 
was part of a larger debate about whether Japan should be invaded or not. The atom bomb itself was 
not successfully tested until July 16, and until then there was a real doubt as to whether the weapon 
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would work and even if it did, how destructive it would turn out to be. As such, before July 16 there 
was an ongoing discussion over a possible invasion of Japan by US ground forces, starting with the 
main southern island of Kyushu. This invasion talk complicates the ethical strategic discussion, as any 
invasion held out the possibility of high casualties amongst both US and Japanese military personnel. 
It also held out the possibility of a high number of Japanese civilian deaths, even more than occurred 
during the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.20   
However, King’s claim that he had consistently argued against any invasion of Japan is 
deceptive. He might have opposed an invasion of Honshu, Japan’s largest island, but he made a strong 
case for the invasion of the southernmost island, Kyushu. In June 1945, when discussion over the 
invasion reached a fever pitch, he spoke clearly in support of an assault on Kyushu.21 There was a 
famous meeting in the White House on June 18 involving Truman, the joint chiefs (though Arnold 
could not make it and was represented by General Ira Eaker), Stimson and the secretary of the navy, 
James Forrestal. During this meeting, King spoke strongly in favour of an invasion of Kyushu, indeed 
he sided with Marshall who painted a generally rosy picture of the casualties the USA would suffer in 
any such operation. King also claimed that seizing Kyushu would provide the USA with real strategic 
advantages.  
‘Admiral King agreed with General Marshall’s views and said that the more he studied 
the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he 
considered the key to success of any siege operations….It was his opinion that we should do 
Kyushu now, after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the 
Russians and the Chinese.’22 
King’s post war comments about his supposed reluctance to use either the bomb or invade 
Japan, therefore, need to be taken with a large grain of salt. They are an indication that he was 
probably the least ethically engaged member of the JCS when it came to the use of the atom bomb 
and the end of the war against Japan. The opposition that he mentioned after the war, instead, had 
everything to do with proving the truth of his vision about the importance of sea power. It says a lot 
about the person. King fought the entire war trying to show the importance (and independence) of 
the United States Navy, as such he was often opposed to cooperating closely with either the American 
Army or the British Navy. He was worried, at the end of the war, that the atom bomb would 
overshadow what he believed was the US Navy’s decisive contribution to victory in the war against 
Japan. 
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Arnold, the head of the air force, had partly similar, partly different motivations. He had a 
rather unusual place in the JCS structure. As the USAAF was still part of the army, Arnold was actually 
Marshall’s subordinate and was usually careful to support Marshall’s positions in larger meetings. 
However, Marshall was far more interested in tactical airpower over strategic, and was sceptical about 
the USAAF’s claims about the efficacy of the latter.23 As such, heand allowed Arnold huge latitude in 
the control of air force operations.24 Both Leahy and King also were also more than happy to treat 
Arnold as an equal member of the JCS and rarely questioned him on questions of air strategy.25 Arnold 
was the member of the JCS who seemed most motivated by thoughts of revenge against the Japanese. 
Members of his aircrews were being publicly executed by the Japanese in 1944 and 1945, as the US 
strategic bombing campaign started to lay waste to Japanese cities. During his trips to the Pacific, he 
heard stories of these executions and other horrific war crimes committed by the Japanese, reacting 
emotionally.26 One would have thought that this would have made Arnold central to the debate over 
the atomic bomb, as it was clear that the new weapon would have to be delivered by one of Arnold’s 
strategic bombers. 
However, Arnold, even though he knew of the Manhattan Project from its beginning, only 
mentioned the bomb’s existence just before it was used and when he did so, remained coy as to his 
own views. Some of this was due to his weak heart. For significant stretches between 1943 and 1945 
Arnold had to take leave after suffering a series of heart attacks. He missed the important White House 
meeting on 18 June because he felt he could not rush back from a visit he was making to the Pacific 
theater. He did not want to put his heart under too much pressure. 
Like King, however, he was also conflicted about the atomic bomb because he did not want 
to detract from what he saw as the USAAF’s specific role in ending the war against Japan. Arnold was 
a great believer in the power of strategic bombing and had specifically put General Curtis LeMay in 
charge of the air force’s campaign against Japan. LeMay, with Arnold’s full backing, had controversially 
turned to the firebombing of Japanese cities.27 Arnold definitely wanted it seen that the air force had 
already done the major job weakening Japan before either the atom bomb was dropped or an invasion 
took place.28  
Unlike King, however, Arnold was involved in the final process of the decision to drop the 
bomb, which took place during the famous Potsdam Conference in late July 1945. Of course, he was 
still careful about the words that he used in his diary. On 23 July he met with Stimson to confer on 
what he called the ‘ultra’ bombing effort.29 The two discussed a wide range of issues including whether 
the bomb would force the Japanese to surrender, how it would affect Japanese psychology and what 
kind of effect it would have on the communities around the target. After meeting with Stimson he 
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wrote, enigmatically; ‘Some day someone will dissolve the atom, release the atomic forces and 
harness the resultant terrific power as a destructive explosive. When?’30 
The next day Arnold received a detailed update on the plans to drop the atom bomb.31 It 
contained all the information that he needed including the targets, the method of delivery (B-29 
bombers) and the type and estimated time of the attack (between 1-10 August). Four cities were listed 
as possible targets, with Hiroshima and Nagasaki the highest priorities. Both were described as large 
industrial cities, with the implication that they had large civilian populations. There was even an 
interesting side note to the effect that it was thought that a large number of Japanese industrialists 
and political figures had taken refuge in them as they had heretofore not been heavily attacked.  
So it was certainly clear to Arnold that a large number of civilians would be killed in the attacks. 
This bothered him little, if at all, at the time, and he was happy to allow his deputy, General Carl Spaatz 
to be given operational control of the bombs.32 Spaatz was serving as the head of all US strategic 
bombing forces, and it was once the weapon was released to his overall control that the clock started 
ticking towards the attack on Hiroshima. He was actually far more open than Arnold in his doubts 
about dropping the bomb, and requested a written order before he agreed to implement the plan to 
cross the atomic threshold.33 
Arnold’s true feelings about the bomb also become complicated by his immediate and longer 
term reactions to the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When the first confirmed news was received 
that the attacks were successful, Arnold was positive, agreeing that they were proper payback for the 
suffering that the Japanese had inflicted on American prisoners of war.34 However, as time went by, 
some have argued that Arnold’s view on the atom bomb became more negative.35 Others, however, 
dispute this.36 
What seems hard to support is the idea that Arnold had a strong ethical objection to the bomb. 
When he did speak negatively, it was to stress that Japan was already defeated, the implication being 
that the bomb was not necessary to force them to surrender. It seems more of a need to show how 
much the USAAF had already done to drive Japan out of the war then to imply that an ethical wrong 
had been committed. In Arnold’s memoirs, for instance, there is no discussion of him being opposed 
to the dropping of the atomic bomb on ethical grounds. The most important point that he seems keen 
to make in his memoirs was that the atom bomb had to be delivered by aircraft.37 
 There might, as in the case of Ernest King, have been a residual doubt in his mind about 
whether the United States should have crossed the atomic threshold, but this cannot obscure the fact 
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that for the last few weeks in July Arnold was involved in the command decisions about the use of the 
bomb, and was willing to let the plan go ahead without objection.  
Marshall and Leahy: The Hard Poles 
If King and Arnold present somewhat obscure and complex reactions to the idea of atomic 
warfare in 1945, the two most powerful members of the joint chiefs, Marshall and Leahy, present 
clearer, contrasting pictures. By this time in the war they were the yin and yang of American grand 
strategy. Between 1942 and 1945 they had often argued for diametrically different ways of war. 
Marshall favored a large-army strategy, based on attacking Germany first with a landing in France as 
soon as possible and, after that, an invasion of Japan as soon as one was practicable. Leahy, on the 
other hand, had a more economic and indirect notion of how victory would be won. He wanted the 
Allies to concentrate on establishing complete air and sea supremacy in both Europe and the Pacific, 
and then once having choked them off, compel German and Japanese surrender. Within this vision 
was Leahy’s belief that American casualties and attacks on civilian targets should be kept to an 
absolute minimum. 
This meant that Leahy and Marshall fought over not only the atom bomb in the spring and 
summer of 1945, but also about the need to invade Japan. Marshall’s views were those of a direct 
soldier. Within the Joint Chiefs he was the most aggressive in pressing for Truman to authorize the 
plan for the Kyushu attack (codenamed Olympic).38 His arguments for Olympic were initially based on 
somewhat optimistic casualty projections. During the meeting in the White House on 18 June, 
Marshall opted to present to the president the rosiest possible picture of expected US casualties for 
Olympic, approximately one American casualty for each 5 Japanese soldiers to be fought.39 It is 
important to see Marshall being so optimistic about casualties, because this contradicts one of his 
most famous statements about dropping the atomic bombs, that it was done to save half a million US 
casualties.  
Because of Marshall’s seniority in the War Department, of all the chiefs he played the most 
prominent official role in the decision on whether and how to use the atom bomb. While not a 
standing member of the Interim Committee, Marshall was invited to attend during two of its most 
important meetings, those on 31 May and 1 June. Marshall was invited specifically because Truman 
had asked that he be involved in making the final decision on the use of the bomb.40 Marshall had 
known of the atomic bomb program from the start, and therefore had already given a good deal of 
thought to how it could be integrated into his strategic vision. Two days before he attended the first 
interim committee meeting, he had a detailed discussion on precisely this question with assistant 
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secretary of war, John McCloy. McCloy recorded Marshall’s thoughts, and demonstrated that the 
general saw the atom bomb as a new weapon, which shared some ethical and strategic similarities 
with poison gas, but which, crucially, was a legitimate weapon of war to be used if the US government 
decided it was needed to end the conflict.  
‘General Marshall said he thought these weapons might first be used against straight 
military objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived 
from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing 
areas from which the people would be warned to leave—telling the Japanese that we intended 
to destroy such centers. There would be no individual designations so that the Japs would not 
know exactly where we were to hit—a number should be named and the hit should follow 
shortly after. Every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear. We must offset 
by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered 
employment of such force. 
The General then spoke of his stimulation of the new weapons and operations people 
to the development of new weapons and tactics to cope with the care and last ditch defense 
tactics of the suicidal Japanese. He sought to avoid the attrition we were suffering from such 
fanatical but hopeless defense methods—it requires new tactics. He also spoke of gas and the 
possibility of using it in a limited degree, say on the outlying islands where operations were now 
going on or were about to take place. He spoke of the type of gas that might be employed. It 
did not need to be our newest and most potent—just drench them and sicken them so that the 
fight would be taken out of them—saturate an area, possibly with mustard, and just stand off. 
He said he had asked the operations people to find out what we could do quickly—where the 
dumps were and how much time and effort would be required to bring the gas to bear. There 
would be the matter of public opinion which we had to consider, but that was something which 
might also be dealt with. The character of the weapon was no less humane than phosphorous 
and flame throwers and need not be used against dense populations or civilians—merely 
against these last pockets of resistance which had to be wiped out but had no other military 
significance.’41 
It was certainly one of the most important reflections given by a US military leader on the 
bomb (and weapons of mass destruction as a whole) during the war. It has been used occasionally to 
say that Marshall had doubts about the use of atomic weapons. However the most revealing thing 
was Marshall’s surprising willingness to contemplate using weapons such as the atom bomb and gas. 
During the war, all the major powers debated whether they should use gas attacks, though in the end 
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no one was willing to do so against another major power (there were examples of the Japanese using 
different gasses in their brutal war against the Chinese).42 Marshall, however, was the most senior 
American who seemed most supportive of using gas if it was thought practicable. Two weeks after he 
spoke to McCloy, Marshall sent King an Army memorandum which called for the pre-emptive use of 
chemical warfare against the Japanese during Olympic.43 
In fact, it was Marshall who from that moment provided the most consistent support for the 
use of atomic weapons. During the two meetings of the interim committee which he attended—the 
ones which determined the direction of weapons usage and during Byrnes claimed that a consensus 
had been reached that the atom bomb should be used without warning on an industrial target that 
contained a large number of worker’s houses—Marshall seemed completely comfortable with the 
idea that the bomb would be used.44 During the 31 May meeting, he spoke almost entirely on the 
atomic bomb’s place in US-USSR relations.45 During the 1 June meeting, the one in which Byrnes made 
his comment about their being a strong consensus on using the bomb, Marshall was silent.46 
In the run up to the use of the bomb Marshall’s silent acceptance moved to a far more active 
assent. By the time of Potsdam, Marshall was eager to use the atom bomb. He had no faith that 
strategic bombing would end the war on its own, and finally understood that the invasion of Japan 
would now be far bloodier than he had claimed in June.47 He admitted (indirectly) to Truman that his 
earlier assumptions of relatively light losses from an invasion of Japan were wrong, and was now 
telling the president that it might cost half a million US casualties to force the Japanese to surrender 
by invading and conquering the home islands.48 He was so worried about the resistance the Japanese 
could pose that he started considering using the atomic bomb as a tactical weapon against Japanese 
troops on Kyushu.49 Thankfully such a disastrous move never occurred. 
After the war, Marshall continued with his strong support for using the atomic bomb. He 
provided more detail than he ever had previously in some interviews given to his biographer, Forrest 
Pogue, not long before his death. By this time, Marshall was more than happy to describe the use of 
the atomic bomb as ‘wise.’ 
‘Q. 71. Do you feel it was necessary to drop the bomb to shorten the war?  
A. I regarded the dropping of the bomb as of great importance and felt that it would 
end the war possibly better than anything else, which it did, and I think that all the claims about 
the bombings and all afterwards were rather silly. Because we had had these terrific 
destructions and it hadn’t had these effects. I think it was quite necessary to drop the bombs in 
order to shorten the war.  
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Q. 72. Do you feel in retrospect that it would have been better to refrain from using it?  
A. In retrospect, I feel the same way about it. There were hundreds and hundreds of 
thousands of American lives involved in these things as well as hundreds of billions of money. 
They had been perfectly ruthless. We had notified them of the bomb. They didn’t choose to 
believe that. And what they needed was shock action and they got it. I think it was very wise to 
use it.’50 
If Marshall represented the most clear-cut example of someone who supported the use of the 
atomic bomb, Leahy represented the most clear-cut example of someone who was opposed. . Leahy 
was Marshall’s superior, not only in position as chairman of the joint chiefs, but also in rank, having 
been promoted to the 5-star level one day before the general.51 Leahy had a remarkable position in 
the US government during the war. As the president’s chief of staff, he was the only policy-making 
individual who had daily, direct access to the Oval Office. He was also, along with Harry Hopkins, the 
only individual who had complete access to Roosevelt’s and Truman’s correspondence with world 
leaders such as Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin.52 
Leahy’s role in the atomic bomb decision has been rather poorly understood, partly because 
Marshall liked to pretend he was more powerful than he really was. After the war Marshall claimed 
that Leahy was only let in on the atomic secret late in the day, not long before the successful test of 
the weapon in July 1945.53 Nothing could be more untrue. Leahy would have been told about the 
atomic bomb by Roosevelt, his close personal friend, almost immediately after he became FDR’s chief 
of staff in July 1942. In fact, as time came on Roosevelt saw Leahy as the only person he could fully 
trust with America’s atomic secrets. This was made explicitly clear in September 1944, when Roosevelt 
invited Churchill to a meeting in Hyde Park NY (the president’s family home) to discuss atomic policy. 
During these top secret meetings the only people in the room were often Roosevelt, Churchill and 
Leahy.54 Marshall was kept far away from Hyde Park during this, and all other meetings during the 
war.55  
The problem we have with Leahy was the same with which Marshall was presented. Leahy 
was discrete and so close to the president that he rarely had to write things down. Before Roosevelt 
died, Leahy spent a good deal of his time trying to shape FDR’s opinion about the bomb—in a negative 
direction. He complained about its cost, predicted it would not work, and believed it was immoral. We 
know this because he mentioned his beliefs to one of the few people in the US government he trusted, 
H. Freeman Matthews. Matthews had worked with Leahy when the latter was the US ambassador to 
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Vichy France in 1941. In 1944-1945 he was head of the State Departments Western European desk 
before becoming Under Secretary of State. 
Matthews was one of the few people with whom Leahy is recorded as discussing the atomic 
bomb, and it was clear not only did Leahy hope it would not work, he believed it would be a tragedy 
if it did and the USA then used it against an enemy.  He told Matthews before it was tested that ‘I 
don't think this thing is going to work, this bomb. But…if it does, it's going to have terrible, terrible 
consequences for the future.’56  Matthews was struck by the intensity of Leahy’s loathing for the atom 
bomb, writing in his unpublished memoirs that the admiral was convinced that the bomb was a 
‘terrible thing for the world.’57 
The problem Leahy had was trying to keep the bomb from being dropped once Roosevelt had 
died. He was not a close friend of Truman and the new president listened to other advisers, such as 
Byrnes and Marshall, as much if not more than he did to Leahy. That did not stop the admiral from 
trying. He was in the room when Truman was given his first detailed briefing about the atomic bomb 
program’s existence and when he and Truman first discussed the weapon, Leahy was very negative. 
He told the president that it was ‘…the biggest fool thing that we have ever done.’58 Truman, however, 
was unmoved by Leahy’s negativity and the admiral was not made a member of the interim 
committee. Byrnes did, however, keep him abreast of developments, paying two evening visits to 
Leahy’s Washington DC townhouse to discuss atomic policy with him.59  
What also makes Leahy’s position unusual was that he strongly opposed dropping the bomb 
and invading Japan at the same time. This position, which might have seemed contradictory, was 
based on a consistent ethical stand that he had shown for much of his career. Starting with his first 
experience of combat, back in the Spanish-American War of 1898, Leahy maintained that the United 
States should not wage war against civilian targets.60 During  World War IIwar he continued this 
position, though it must be said that there was a certain amount of self-deception in his approach. He 
believed the USAAF when they claimed that they were doing ‘precision’ attacks against Axis targets.61 
Only when he attended the Potsdam Conference in July did he see the true devastation that had been 
inflicted by strategic bombing. Leahy’s heartfelt opposition to the use of the atom bomb came from 
the strength of his ethical convictions, which he admitted overrode his more logical side. As he told a 
close aide ‘…deep in the heart, I don’t like to see weapons like that developed and used.’62 
As a sign that Leahy’s lobbying might have been playing in Truman’s mind, it was only after 
the president and his chief of staff arrived for the Potsdam Conference that Truman wrote in his diary 
that he did not want the atom bomb used against women and children. 
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If seeing the devastation in Germany only reconfirmed Leahy’s opposition to the use of the 
atom bomb, he was left with the basic conundrum that the same ethical standard which had him 
opposing the bomb also led him to argue against any invasion of Japan. Leahy believed that with Japan 
completely cut off from the rest of the world by US air and sea power, the war was over and the 
Japanese government would have to surrender—sooner rather than later. As the war was over in his 
mind, the idea of invading Japan to possibly hasten its end seemed pointless; further slaughter and 
the death and maiming of hundreds of thousands on both sides that would make little material 
difference to the war’s outcome. It was why he led the opposition to the invasion of Kyushu on 18 
June and continued afterwards to impress on the president the terrible cost any such attack would 
incur. 
In many ways he succeeded too well in this task, and made Truman even more eager to use 
the bomb when it was shown to be operable. Leahy’s overall position would have been politically very 
difficult for Truman to take (were the president even inclined to do it—which he was not). Truman 
wanted the war to be over, and if the atom bomb offered him an opportunity to speed up that process, 
he was darn sure he was going to take it. 
When the bomb was dropped Leahy suffered a severe depression. He remarked to those 
closest to him that the United States had committed a grave ethical mistake, as war was never to be 
waged directly against civilian targets.63 To some who knew him, the regret he felt at the bomb’s use 
was so great it represented the moment when his robust health first started to give way. In his 
memoirs, written 5 years later, he could not contain his regrets. He stated outright that in using the 
bomb the United States ‘had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark ages. 
I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and 
children.’64 
 The Atom Bomb, the End of the War and the Lost Victory 
Writing in 1949, Arnold decried what he saw as the failure of victory in the Second World War 
to bring a true peace. ‘One thing stands out clearly against the background of my experience: the 
winning of peace is much more difficult than the winning of even a global war. One look at the 
condition of the poor old world today, four years after the supposed ending of World War II, almost 
makes me gasp. Where is our peace?’65 Arnold was giving voice to a feeling that was shared by most 
of the joint chiefs (and many others). The war was supposed to lead to a longstanding and solid period 
of peace, and yet within years relations between the USA and the USSR had deteriorated so 
dramatically that an even more destructive, nuclear war, seemed a real possibility. Leahy, who played 
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a very important role in determining US policy during the Cold War, was maybe even more depressed. 
‘Victory’ to him meant far more than conquering Japan and Germany. As he surveyed the world, he 
believed that the United States was and would continue ‘paying for this war in many ways long after 
we, and our children too, had passed away. It may require the better part of a century to bind up the 
wounds of a world torn in its physical structure by forces which were unleashed first by the aggressor 
nations and then by us.’66  
It might be surprising to see the chiefs being so ambiguous about the meaning of victory in the 
war. They had done their job. Germany and Japan had been completely conquered, their armed forces 
destroyed, and their ability to threaten the United States nullified. Yet, the war was supposed to be 
more than this, and by a higher standard it fell short. There were two specific ways this was tied to 
the atomic bomb decision. The first was the meaning of the bomb in the post-war world, and this was 
what most preoccupied Leahy. What Leahy was most worried about was that if the USA used the 
bomb in a first strike attack, it would make it far more likely that it would suffer similarly in the coming 
years or decades once other powers also developed atomic weaponry. He wanted the USA to send a 
message to the world that the atom bomb was such a terrible weapon (in his mind morally equivalent 
or even worse than poison gas) that it should not be used even if it was being targeted on a country 
that had no retaliatory capability. After the war he continued his crusade against atomic weapons. He 
wrote one of the first detailed definitions of weapons of mass destruction in the US government.67 
Until he left office in early 1949 he did his best to ensure that the USA did not have a formally approved 
first strike atomic policy. 
Then there was the question of the meaning of the bomb, victory and the Cold War. Where the 
chiefs were different from many in the civilian hierarchy, most prominently Byrnes, was that even 
those who supported using the bomb had no desire that it be seen as a weapon against the USSR, a 
way to use ‘victory’ to intimidate the Soviets. They saw victory as being over Naziism and Imperial 
Japan. They were less engaged with starting a new competition with the USSR. Though they had some 
differences in their views of the atom bomb, they had little or no interest in using the bomb to start a 
competitive new era over the USSR, to manipulate victory as part of an early Cold War. This difference, 
perhaps more than any other, showed the difference of the military mind from the civilian.  
In the end two very important differences stand out between the military and the civilian 
leadership. Compared to Truman, Byrnes and Stimson—Leahy, Marshall, King and Arnold had not only 
a wider range of opinion they had, perhaps most surprisingly, more doubts about the use of the bomb. 
Three of the four mentioned different concerns about the bomb after the war and one, Leahy, spoke 
out against it before it was dropped. Their opposition emerged from different impulses; ethical, 
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practical and to a certain degree selfish. Arnold and King, for instance, were both concerned with 
protecting the reputation of their branch of the armed service in causing the defeat of Japan. They did 
not want the atom bomb to obscure what they believed were the decisive roles of the USAAF and USN 
in bringing Japan to defeat. Both also had some ethical doubts about using the weapon, and were 
certainly uneasy discussing it after the war. However, in both cases it is important not to overstate the 
ethical component in their thinking. Leahy on the other hand, had enormous ethical problems with 
dropping the bomb, and publicly aired them in his memoirs which were published not long after he 
left office. In fact, Leahy was the person at the upper echelon of the US government most opposed to 
the use of atomic weapons. No civilian matched the intensity or duration of his opposition. Even 
Marshall, who was the most robust in arguing for the use of the atomic bomb (and that of poison gas) 
was found to have made qualifying comments a few months before Hiroshima, in which he said the 
bomb should first be used on a strictly military target and only later be used to attack civilians if the 
Japanese had still not surrendered. 
Why did the military debate differ so from the civilian and what did it have to say about the 
end of the war? To begin with, the debate showed that the military, or at least some of its leadership 
at the JCS level, did not see the Second World War as a war which would automatically transform the 
USA into a permanent global police force. They were much more concerned with the defeat of the 
Axis Powers, and in protecting what they saw as the reputation of the United States and its armed 
services for fighting wars properly and effectively in doing so. They had little interest in making a grand 
global statement about American power, to intimidate, for instance, the USSR. In other words, again 
it was the military leadership of the United States that was least likely to see the world war mutating 
quickly into a Cold War. In this way the Joint Chiefs present a very different debate from that which 
has obsessed many historians for the past decades. Intimidating the Soviet Union had only miniscule 
impact on their thinking. They rarely, if at all, connected the bomb to an attempt to limit Soviet 
expansion. Only George Marshall ever addressed the question before the attacks on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and even he did it in a non-commital way. Certainly compared to Byrnes or even Truman, 
the military leadership of the United States was more restrained and less aggressive when it came to 
planning for the post-war world.  
It leaves us with one of the great questions about the end of the war. Had the US military had 
its way, the war might have ended very differently. The bomb might not have been dropped and the 
war could have continued on for months longer until either an invasion of Kyushu, the entry of the 
USSR into the conflict or even an extended air-sea blockade would have forced the Japanese to 
surrender. The atomic threshold would not have been crossed, but on the other hand, far more 
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Japanese, both military and civilian, would have died had an invasion or extended blockade occurred. 
There is no easy answer in this debate, as there was no easy answer at the time.  
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